Preliminary Program

The SCADA System Solution as Core Component of Digitalization
SCADA systems have undergone rapid development in the Industry in the last fifteen years. Increased networking as part of digitalization has made transparency in production and therefore intelligent data preparation increasingly important. When selecting suitable systems, plant operators look for innovative and reliable solutions to visualize the ever more complex procedures in industrial production and access to information about relevant production data and processes. This presentation examines the role of a SCADA system acting as the Elmers Glue for factory floor data providing central aggregation, data normalization and redistribution of information to up to the Digital Enterprise.

Carl Hoffman, SCADA Business Developer -Siemens Industry, Inc.

SCADA In the Cloud
Although cloud computing is becoming more common, its relatively new for SCADA applications. Cloud computing provides convenient, on-demand network access to a shared pool of configurable computing resources including networks, servers, storage, applications, and services. These resources can be rapidly provisioned and released with minimal management effort or service provider interaction.

By moving to a cloud-based environment, SCADA providers and users can significantly reduce costs, achieve greater reliability, and enhance functionality. In addition to eliminating the expenses and problems related to the hardware layer of IT infrastructure, cloud-based SCADA enables users to view data on devices like smartphones and tablet computers, and also through SMS text messages and e-mail.

Larry Combs, VP of Customer Service and Support – Indusoft

How a Rural Telco Successfully Monitors Their 3 Fiber Rings – and How They Restored Alarms After a Switch Upgrade
Interbel Telephone has about 3,500 access lines, 3 fiber rings, 1 central office, and about 30  remote sites. On this Q&A session, learn how they remotely monitor and control their infrastructure to be a highly reliable telephone company in a rural area.

Rob Little, Plant Manager at Interbel Telephone, will give an overview of Interbel’s infrastructure. With generators, power status, doors, smoke alarms, fuse alams, and more, there’s a lot to monitor at Interbel. Rob will explain the network-visbility challenges inherent in his work, and he’l explain how he’s solved them. Learn how to minimize windshield time and expensive network outages with the benefit of Rob’s extensive experience.

Andrew Erickson from DPS Telecom will reveal the Top 10 most important monitoring strategies. These real-world tips & tricks were gathered by surveying the DPS client base of telcos, utilities, railway operators, and government agencies. Learn how one phone company is leveraging remote-monitoring technology to maximize efficiency and minimize downtime. Learn what network operators of all kinds recommend that you do to keep your network online, conserve budget, and comply with government regulations.

Rob Little, Plant Manager – Interbel Telephone
Andrew Erickson, Director of Marketing – DPS Telecom

Smart Pipeline Leak Detection System
This presentation discusses recent work focused on the development of a machine learning-based, low power, remote sensing technology that is capable of reliably and autonomously detecting small hazardous pipeline leaks (liquids and gases) in real-time.

The system fuses inputs from various types of passive optical sensors and applies machine learning techniques to reliably detect “fingerprints” of small hazardous leaks.  Optical sensors used include: long-wave infrared, short-wave infrared, hyperspectral, and visual cameras. However, different types and/or combinations of sensors allow the technology to easily adapt to changing applications, environments, and target substances.

While much has been accomplished in developing remote sensing technologies, limited work has been done in developing solutions that meet three key critical criteria for effective anomaly detection and mitigation: (1) autonomy (no need for a human to be in the loop), (2) high reliability (low false alarm rates), and (3) real-time performance (ability to detect anomalies within a few minutes).  It is the emphasis on these three key aspects that significantly advances the state-of-the-art in leak detection using optically-based sensing technologies.  Trial results of this work will be presented.

Samantha Blaisdell, Research Engineer – Southwest Research Institute

Manufacturing Implementation of the NIST Cybersecurity Framework
The Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) is a voluntary, risk-based approach for managing cybersecurity activities and reducing cyber risk within an organization. A manufacturing implementation of the CSF, or Profile, was developed to establish a roadmap for reducing cybersecurity risk that is aligned with manufacturing sector goals and industry best practices. The Manufacturing Profile is being implemented in the NIST Cybersecurity for Smart Manufacturing Testbed using various cybersecurity solutions to meet the Profile and any network or operational performance impacts are being measured. The NIST Cybersecurity for Smart Manufacturing Testbed includes process control and robotic assembly systems. From this research, guidance will be developed on implementing the CSF in manufacturing environments without having negative performance impacts on the systems.

Keith Stouffer, Cybersecurity for Smart Manufacturing Systems Project Lead -
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)

Dynamic Flow Setpoint Program
Learn about a Dynamic Flow Set-Point Program that was developed for remote pumping facilities with local storage to stabilize the demand they place on the treatment plant.

At midnight, the program calculates the required influent flow set-point based on the demand from the previous day.In manual operation, the flow set-point is fixed and the program learns the level profile of the reservoir by recording it every hour.In automatic mode, the program re-calculates the influent flow set-point by comparing the reservoir level with the expected level in the reservoir.

  • If the reservoir level deviates from its expected level, the influent flow set-point is dynamically increased or decreased to move the level back towards its expected level.
  • At the end of each hour, the new value of the level profile for that hour of the day is calculated and the entire level profile may be raised or lowered to ensure that, even though the shape of the profile may change, it remains anchored to the minimum operating level.

The program maximizes turnover in the reservoirs, adapts to accommodate seasonal changes, and adjusts flow to compensate for unexpected changes in demand long before the reservoir level approaches either high or low alarm limits.

Alasdair MacLean,Manager of Instrumentation & Controls – EPCOR Water

SCADA and IT Speak the Same Language
There is often resistance between SCADA and IT due to differing priorities and disciplines within the organization. A better focus on company goals and objectives can help unify SCADA and IT personnel to reduce friction and lay the groundwork for better SCADA development and IT protocols that make for improved network and SCADA security. By ensuring that both SCADA developers and IT personnel understand the objectives of each new phase of implementation, its possible to ensure both teams work toward common goals of reliability, flexibility, and security.

Larry Combs, VP of Customer Service and Support – Indusoft

FCC Compliance and Frequency Recommendations/Selection for SCADA and MAS systems
Purchasing radio equipment may seem as easy as buying a new laptop, yet there is more involved. Just like purchasing a license for a computer operating system, like Windows, a company has a responsibility to apply and secure an authorization from the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). The license process involves a formal application, frequency recommendation from an FCC recognized Frequency Coordinator and user compliance. Let us discuss the nuances of this requirement and how to avoid potential hefty fines from the FCCs Enforcement Bureau for operating a SCADA out of compliance.

Elizabeth Buckley, FCC-FAA Licensing Expert -FCC-FAA Licensing, LLC
Mona Lee, President -Mona Lee and Associates

Designing an Industrial Wireless Network: Steps to Ensure Reliability
While there are many wireless solutions available for the industrial market, wireless is not a “one size fits all.” It is important to make sure that all components of a wireless network are chosen correctly to ensure reliable operation. This presentation will offer basic guidelines on how to find the most reliable wireless solution for industrial wireless applications.

Whether you are adding wireless to an existing installation or designing an entirely new application, focusing on efficient design and installation practices is critical, especially for the industrial world.

A properly designed wireless solution can fit into nearly any process installation. Before deciding on a specific wireless technology or components, however, an installer needs to examine three main factors: interference, distance, and speed. This presentation will cover these three main factors and provide some applications that represent how each of these factors are important to take into consideration during the design of an existing or new wireless system.

Zechariah Hoffman, Wireless Product Specialist for I/O and Networks -
Phoenix Contact USA

SCADA Over DMR Tier III
In order to reduce costs and increase reliability, companies that rely on SCADA for their daily operations are continually seeking alternative solutions for transport of their data.By conducting field and lab trials, one large UK based utility company determined that carrying SCADA traffic over its own licensed, tier III DMR radio network was an optimal solution for full deployment across its vast electrical grid.

A VHF DMR Tier III radio network was built to support the 8,000 data points that needed monitoring. It forms a fully integrated IP Network to connect information sent from data modems and Remote Terminal Units (RTU) back to the monitoring devices also on the IP network. This makes the solution easy to scale since more modems, RTU or monitoring devices can be added as needed. Additionally it provides the Operations & Maintenance teams a constant insight into the health of the electric grid, all over reliable, privately licensed radio channels, and the ability to carry voice communications over the network.

If a problem is detected on the Electric Grid, time and money is saved by knowing exactly where the fault has occurred. The ultimate goal of having all service interruptions restored within 60 minutes of notification has become more of the norm than the exception by relying on the DMR Tier III IP Network for transport of the SCADA information.

Gary Correia,Vice President Sales & Business Development, Americas -Simoco

Intelligent Monitoring and Control: Essential Guidance for Critical Infrastructure Security
In recent months, security investigators have discovered numerous vulnerabilities specific to one protocol, in particular DNP3, a firewall-averse link found throughout SCADA systems that drive most water, energy and electrical systems and utilities. Some of these vulnerabilities can damage equipment and impede or even halt operations.

Industrial networks facilitate the free flow of messages that can allow poison packets to transmit with potentially disastrous effect. The use of DNP3 Secure Authentication doesnt protect all payloads or those from a compromised device, making validated protocol-aware packet inspection essential.A comprehensive approach should become the standard for fully parsing the DNP3 protocol, including DNP3 Secure Authentication messages, to detect any malformed, unauthorized, or malicious messages.

To illustrate protocol problems and their resolution, case-based scenarios will draw from the US Navy’s Enterprise Industrial Controls System (EICS) deployment.The narrative will be supported by findings from a collaborative DNP3 security review with security experts. Dozens of vulnerabilities were discovered and reported that affected industrial-control software and systems. Participants will better understand through the findings how seemingly security-immune connections, such as those managed by DNP3, can be made safe without slowing or interfering with network operations and fidelity.

Matthew Cowell,Director of Industrial Markets – Ultra Electronics, 3eTI

The Fourth Industrial Revolution: Bridging the Gap Between OT and IT Needs
The Industrial IoT (IIoT) revolution has brought many benefits to manufacturers, mainly designed to increase productivity and reduce operational costs. One of the main results of the IIoT is the increased connectivity between the IT (Information Technology) and OT (Operational Technology) environments. The increased connectivity between the industrial OT networks and the outside world has made manufacturing industries a prime target of hackers.

This presentation will outline the major security risks currently in the industrial ecosystem, highlighting some of the real-life cyberattacks that have occurred to date, including the first evercyber blackout in the Ukraine, theDragonFly campaign targeting sensitive information inpharmaceuticalproduction environments and massive explosions caused by a cyber-attack against aGermansteelmill. It will also map the current threat landscape by offering some interesting trends and statistics, while explaining what can be done to better protect against this new threat on the organizational level and using technologies and products designed for OT environments.

Yoni Shohet, Co-founder and CEO – SCADAfence

Essentials of Cyber Security Intelligence for Protecting ICS
Modernization of ICS includes new applications and systems that utilize interconnected IP networks. These IP networks carry an increasing amount of data and control information for intelligent end points involved in operating critical infrastructures. With this evolution, exposure to cyber threats exists from both internal and external sources.

This session offers insights into successful ICS hacks and identifies common ways in which hackers gain access to critical infrastructure networks, data and assets. We will also explore insider cyber risks and ways in which many of these can be avoided or greatly reduced.

An overview of cyber security best practices for ICS will be presented and we will share case studies from several utilities that have utilized timely cyber security intelligence to reduce their risk exposure.

Jeff Bridgland – N-Dimension Solutions Advisory Board Member

Hacking Critical Infrastructure Becomes Easier Everyday
Operation Technologies (OT) and Information Technologies (IT) are converging. This convergence has caused an important change in the modern threat landscape due to the connectivity of industrial control systems (ICS) to the digital environment. While engineers and operators of ICSs are very familiar with OT there has been little overlap with those in the IT area and typically OT and IT are managed by different parts of the business in isolation. SCADA systems now connect through 3G/4G and GSM-R has replaced the previously used analogue radio systems used in the transport network but how secure are these systems? Is an isolated SCADA system really isolated or can you hack it by gaining access through its ICS vendor? Can you hack a digital substation using the telecom network or, indeed, hijack a high speed train?

The defense is a better security strategy.In the presentation will be given informations about major threats and defense strategies observed in 10 years research. This is not what we class as a product pitch but rather an opportunity to share our research in this environment.

Paolo Emiliani,ICS Security Manager (Europe) – Positive Technologies

The Anatomy of an Industrial Cyber Attack
We will skip the standard pitch about why ICS networks are vulnerable and the criticality of operational continuity, and go right to the point, which is to explain how ICS cyber attacks really operate and where are the security gaps that enable these attacks. Industrial networks are inherently different than IT networks. In most IT cyber attack scenarios, the same protocols are used for configuration and production operations. However, in industrial networks, different protocols are used for different types of operations. The builders of Stuxnet understood this more than 5 years ago, yet most security specialists still dont fully understand the difference.

In this session we will discuss:

  • The need to monitor the proprietary network protocols and track all changes to the controllers
  • Why changes to PLC code blocks are transparent to standard OT protocol inspections (i.e. MODBUS/DNP3/ICCP) and what should be monitored
  • Which additional security gaps must be addressed in order to protect ICS networks against cyber-attacks, malicious insiders and human errors

Join us for this myth-busting session in which we will dispel common fables around industrial cyber attacks and explain how they really operate.

Barak Perelman, CEO and Co-Founder – Indegy

How to Secure the CompactRIO with National Instruments Linux Real-Time and SELinux
Learn how Security Enhanced Linux (SELinux) on the cRIO/sbRIO platform works and where it fits in an embedded system security architecture. Tresys Technology, the maintainers of the SELinux open source tools, will describe how SELinux works, what it can control, and how it can prevent an attacker from using a single bug in an application to own an entire device. National Instruments Gold Alliance Partner, Prolucid Technologies, will give an overview of where SELinux fits into each layer of security in their architecture that helped its LabVIEW-based products meet their customers’ stringent security requirements.

Art Wilson,Vice President of Technology – Tresys Technology
Graham Beauregard, software technology expert -Prolucid Technologies

ROI on Cyber Security Monitoring Technologies
Measuring true return on investment (ROI) for cyber security monitoring continues to elude many executives. In many cases, it may not make financial sense for some small to medium sized businesses to invest in the hardware, software, training, and personnel required to provide cyber security intrusion detection monitoring.

Outsourcing some of the security monitoring and management allows an external firm to pick up the heavy lifting associated with this type of work, which in turn allows your existing team to focus on the core business that you need them to do.

This session will explore why it makes sense to have an outsourced managed security firm watching over your corporate network especially in cases where you have multiple locations and you want them all to be protected to the same level.

John Christly,Chief Information Security Officer -Netsurion

SCADA Cyber Security in the Age of Internet of Things
SCADA systems, and the broader Industrial Control Systems (ICS) including Human Machine Interface, Building Management Systems, Manufacturing Execution System and Computerized Maintenance Management Systems, have roots in proprietary technology that was traditionally isolated from the enterprise information technology (IT) infrastructure.  These platforms were not originally designed for cyber security.

The current focus on connectivity under the banner of the Internet of Things (IoT), and the closely related Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) or Industry 4.0, has a huge potential benefit to data aggregation strategy and situational awareness.  However, the very nature of IIoT devices is the use of Internet Protocols (IP), which further increases the exposure to cyber threats.

Learn how the modern ICS platforms incorporate the Software Engineering Institute’s Cyber Risk and Resilience Management into the ISO 9001 Quality Process for development and production.  The goal is to be transparent regarding internally or externally reported vulnerabilities and to act quickly to minimize risk for customers.

Participation in the National Agency for the Security of Information Systems and standards organization such as the IEEE and the IEC assist in reaching the goal of transparency through open discussion and feedback.  Participation is critical to rapid implementation of the recommendations coming from these organizations.

The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has provided a framework that is invaluable for systematically identifying an organization’s critical assets, identifying threats, and securing critical assets. The framework is identify, protect, detect and react.

Edward Nugent, COO – PcVue, Inc.

Connected World Security – Cyber and Physical
In today’s connected world, many systems are able to communicate on a wired or wireless network to exchange data. It is essential that these devices be secured against emerging threats that could compromise the confidentiality, integrity, and availability (CIA) of these devices and the data they use.

This presentation will explore methods to secure these devices, regardless if they are connected via wired or wireless connections. We will also explore the concept of utilizing managed security service providers to watch over these devices and to act upon intrusions that could affect the device or its data.

Managed security service providers deploy state of the art hardware and manage the security of many clients across the globe, so they have the advantage of knowing what emerging threats are targeting certain verticals or geographic areas, allowing them to make risk based decisions faster and with more accuracy than most firms can do on their own.

As it pertains to physical security, this presentation will explore the various threats to a business that are non-cyber related, including everything from a disgruntled customer who could do damage to your place of business, to employees that steal from you.

John Christly, Chief Information Security Officer (CISO) – Netsurion

How Well Chronicled Cyber-attacks Can Damage Nation’s Utilities
Due to the wide range of industrial control implementations, architectures, and impacts, the industrial cyber security market is rightly advocating a risk-based management approach. However, technology and attackers often outpace the assumptions made in the risk assessment, leading to a “protect against the last attack” approach. Good perimeter security and computer endpoint protection are sound security recommendations, but do they really protect against the threats going forward?

An industrial control or automation system is not the same as an enterprise IT system for the simple reason that the risks and the impacts are different. Security solutions must fit within the operational constraints of the system and within the risk appetite of the client organization. Otherwise the fix can cause a greater impact overall than an attack. This presentation also will provide proposals and approaches for addressing the underlying security problems inherent in control systems that should be considered in addition those generally proposed.

In this session you will learn:

  • Introduction and overview: The utilities-security landscape
  • Understanding the challenges: How utility systems are easily breached
  • Appreciating the risk severity: Summarizing actual and potential results of cyber-attack
  • Considerations in developing a cyber security plan
  • Methods for efficiently implementing a utilities plan for cyber security: Understanding tactics, technologies, costs and timelines

David Batz, Cyber Security Systems Engineer – Ultra Electronics, 3eTI

Eliminating Security Blind spots in SCADA and Control Networks
The need for visibility and security in SCADA and ICS networks is growing, as recent attacks such as the Ukrainian electric utility, the New York City dam, and other have demonstrated. Designed years ago, before the cyber threat existed these networks are not only vulnerable to attacks, but also lack visibility and security controls common in corporate IT networks.

Contrary to popular belief, it is not difficult to attack these vulnerable networks. However, they are quite difficult to defend. In this session we will examine what needs to be done in order to gain the visibility necessary to detect and respond to malicious and unauthorized activities in SCADA and ICS environments.

Join us to learn more about

  • External and internal threats to SCADA/ICS networks
  • The hidden security gaps in SCADA/ICS networks
  • The need to monitor the proprietary network protocols and track all changes to the controllers

Barak Perelman, CEO and Co-Founder – Indegy

Hybrid SCADA Communication Networks Using SD Radios
Energy companies with large geographically dispersed networks usually don’t select just one technology, or one manufacturing source and seldom one vendor to collect, diagnose and report today’s SCADA data information. Linux based radio platforms have the ability to assess the health of the communications network, extracting MIB’s from the radio information and using SolarWinds, OpenNMS, OPC Systems or other types of diagnostic software is now normal. In times past they may have used a single communication type or manufacturer, today the Hybrid type of approach makes more sense.

Today integrating various types of technologies can offer significant benefits that can be easily and cost-effectively incorporated into one cohesive network. You have the ability today to be able to choose several types of RF spectrum, speeds, RS232 and RS485 serial, I/O and Ethernet devices at various speeds and multiple types of inputs all in one communications network.

During this presentation, all of the factors necessary for considering a hybrid communications networks using SD radios will be discussed. There will be a review of several different types of telemetry technologies, including the benefits and challenges of leveraging them in a hybrid network setting. Furthermore, the presenter will review several key considerations for reviewing a system prior to any installation.

Dan Steele – XetaWave

Going Beyond Monitoring in Backup Battery Systems
Telecommunications companies rely on backup battery systems to maintain uptime. Many sites have generators, but virtually all have lead-acid batteries. A range of remote monitoring technologies are now available for these batteries, including those that go beyond monitoring by managing batteries, and allow technicians more remote control over the site.

We will discuss successful applications of battery technology in telecom, walking through a variety of examples where a ‘more-than-monitoring’ technology has helped identify and solve issues that otherwise may have been undetected. For many carriers, managing batteries involves replacing them on a preset schedule, whether or not they need replacing. Scheduled testing may or may not complement these replacements. Both involve unnecessary maintenance time, extra cost if healthy batteries are replaced early, and extra risk if unhealthy batteries fail between cycles or tests.

Secondly we will examine the business case for monitoring and management technologies compared to traditional methods of maintenance and manual management. Finally, we will use the information covered to speak to the direction of the industry towards greater remote control capabilities. Monitoring is extraordinarily useful, but technology will also allow improved feedback loops that must constantly be increasing efficiency. The key to these loops is compiling and processing accurate data.

Alex Rawitz, Business Development Manager – Servato

In-Pipe Turbine Generator for Onsite Power
New technology has been developed that allows an in-pipe turbine generator (IPTG) to generate electrical power by recovering energy from gas or other fluids flowing through a pipe. The unit is designed to operate unattended at remote locations that have limited or no access to commercial power. The IPTG has no emissions and does not consume fuel.

Attend this session and learn about how IPTG technology is more reliable than wind or solar, and does not suffer the drawbacks of TEG or other combustion-based technologies. The IPTG replaces a short section of pipe at or near a wellhead. The flow of the fluid through the pipe spins an internal, permanent magnet array. The magnetic flux generated produces current in a coil array external to the pipe. Output is 24 V DC, and is sufficient to power SCADA or small motors, or to charge batteries or serve other general utility uses.

Bruce Kaiser, Founder and CEO – Lightning Master

Remote Switch Gear Circuit Breaker Maintenance by Mobile Agent Software Technology
Circuit breakers are crucial components for power system operations. To ensure circuit breakers are in healthy condition, periodical inspection and preventive maintenance are typically performed. New maintenance techniques and methodologies are emerging, while the circuit breakers keep improving in their designs and functions. As an example, some new circuit breakers have embedded monitoring instruments available to measure the coil current profiles and the operation timing. The recorded information can be used to monitor the condition of breakers during each operation.

When applied properly, both the size of the maintenance crew and maintenance cost may be reduced greatly with a condition-directed maintenance approach. Since the number of circuit breakers in a power system is usually very big, a small maintenance cost saving per each circuit breaker can accumulate to a considerable benefit for the whole system. A more systematic solution is Reliability Centered Maintenance (RCM), which can be used to select the most appropriate maintenance strategy. By equipping the crew with new information access methods to replace the old paper-based information exchange and logging method, the efficiency may be improved since less time will be spent on preparation, reporting and logging.

Dhruvin Thakkar, P&G Department – L&T- Technology Services Limited